Saving Seafood

‘Chevron Deference,’ Key Issue in Fisheries Management, Questioned by Supreme Court Nominee

February 2, 2017 (SAVING SEAFOOD) — On January 31, President Donald Trump nominated Judge Neil Gorsuch of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to fill the vacant seat on the Supreme Court. If confirmed, the Court may potentially reexamine the legal principle of Chevron deference, a principle that has heavily impacted fisheries management.

Chevron deference is a legal principle established in 1984, in the Supreme Court case of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. It states that in cases when the meaning of federal laws is unclear, courts should prioritize the interpretations of the regulatory agencies, such as NOAA. Practically, this has the effect of bolstering the influence of the federal bureaucracy at the expense of judicial review. In the case of fishery management, this has resulted in several instances where courts have upheld agency decisions whose legality has been disputed by the fishing community.

Most notably, in Lovgren v. Locke the plaintiffs (including fishermen and several municipalities in New England) challenged the establishment of catch shares management in New England in 2010 as being in violation of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act. The First Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Chevron in ruling in favor of the Commerce Department. This principle also was cited last year by District Court for the District of New Hampshire as a reason why the lawsuit against NOAA’s at-sea monitoring industry funding requirements failed.

While the Supreme Court – including Justice Scalia – has previously applied Chevron deference on several occasions, Judge Gorsuch has expressed trepidation about its merits. In his concurring opinion for Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, Gorsuch wrote:

“What would happen in a world without Chevron? […] Surely Congress could and would continue to pass statutes for executive agencies to enforce. And just as surely agencies could and would continue to offer guidance on how they intend to enforce those statutes. The only difference would be that courts would then fulfill their duty to exercise their independent judgment about what the law is.”

While Judge Gorsuch has only been nominated recently, should he ascend to the High Court, look for a reexamination of the principle of Chevron deference in the coming years.

George Will on Merrick Garland and “Chevron deference.”

WASHINGTON (March 21, 2016) — The Republican party’s incoherent response to the Supreme Court vacancy is a partisan reflex in search of a justifying principle. The multiplicity of Republican rationalizations for their refusal to even consider Merrick Garland radiates insincerity.

Republicans instantly responded to Antonin Scalia’s death by proclaiming that no nominee, however admirable in temperament, intellect, and experience, would be accorded a hearing. They say their obduracy is right because:

Because they have a right to be obdurate, there being no explicit constitutional proscription against this.

Or because President Obama’s demonstrated contempt for the Constitution’s explicit text and for implicit constitutional manners justifies Republicans reciprocating with contempt for his Supreme Court choice, regardless of its merits.

Or because, 24 years ago, then-senator Joe Biden — he is not often cited by Republicans seeking validation — suggested that a president’s right to nominate judges somehow expires, or becomes attenuated, in a “political season,” sometime after the midterm elections during a second presidential term.

Or because if a Republican president tried to fill a Court vacancy during his eighth year, Democrats would behave the way Republicans are behaving.

Read the full column at the National Review