BOSTON – October 3, 2011 – New Bedford Mayor Scott Lang was among the group of officials at a Senate Field Hearing today who blamed federal regulators for hurting an already depleted fishing industry. His written testimony follows.
On behalf of the people of the City of New Bedford, I would like to express my appreciation to Senator John Kerry, member of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation for holding this hearing at the State House in Boston, Massachusetts. I also extend my gratitude to participating Members of Congress, Senator Scott Brown, Congressman Barney Frank, Congressman William Keating, and Congressman John Tierney.
I write this today representing the City of New Bedford, the number one fishing port in the United States, and as an ally of fishing communities throughout the country.
The value of the New England Fishery cannot be understated socially, economically and culturally. It reaches back to our roots as a nation in the 1600s and drove the early settlement of New England. Today, New Bedford's commercial fishing industry creates a one billion dollar economic impact and employs over 4,000 people. 200 shore side businesses support commercial fishing activity, yielding wages well above the city’s median wage. In 2009, the median average wage in New Bedford sat at $38,684 compared to a port median wage of $49,998, according to an Economic Assessment performed by HRA Associates for the New Bedford Harbor Development Commission. The jobs as well as the tax base these businesses provide to the City are directly tied to the fishing industry. Consequently, the vitality of the fishery touches every part of the socio-economic make up of our community including, the employment rate, household incomes, real estate values, and social welfare.
A long history of restrictive regulation has resulted in reductions in fishing effort through various management strategies including fewer days at sea, closed areas, and methods for allocating allowable catch. These measures have cut deeply into profits of fishermen and boat owners. According to a 2008 study on employment, income and working conditions of commercial fishermen performed by Daniel Georgianna, Chancellor Professor of Economics for the University of Massachusetts, wages for offshore draggers decreased after the implementation of Amendment 13 to the Multispecies Management Plan. Wages dropped from $35,987 in 2002 to $29,614 in 2005. The implementation of catch shares further exacerbates this economic down cycle as discussed below.
Effective May, 2010, the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) implemented Amendment 16 and the catch share program. This management approach implements Annual Catch Limits and Accountability Measures that mandate the shutdown of the fishery, if the catch limits of any specie in the fishery are exceeded. Further, the Amendment adopts a “sector” framework in which groups of fishermen join into sectors. Each sector is assigned a portion of the Total Allowable Catch for each species within the Multispecies complex based on the historical fishing activity of the members in each given sector.
On a number of fronts the catch share program in its current configuration proves problematic and inequitable, the most significant flaw being the framework’s complete disconnect with National Standard Number 8 of the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA), “Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the conservation requirements of this Act (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of overfished stocks), take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such communities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities.” The catch share, sector program makes it so expensive to fish, that boat owners are exiting the industry and/or leasing their permits. The program cost per boat runs as high as $17,000 to $27,000 per vessel in a fishery where the gross landings per vessel total approximately $130,000 . The inevitable result has been a consolidation of the fleet and a redistribution of wealth without any real evidence of conservation gain.
In the New England Fishery, the number of active vessels has dropped from 566 in 2009 to 450 in 2010 and crew positions have decreased from 2,442 in 2009 to 2,277 in 2010 . The loss of jobs and the economic ramifications remain to be fully understood. However, the reality we are living is that the catch share consolidation result is causing divestment and job loss that will generate tremendous welfare costs. National Standard 8 purports to protect the socio-economics of communities and is being sorely ignored.
Also important to note is the current disregard for achieving optimal yield as required in National Standard 1 of the SFA, “Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry.” The options the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) selects at every turn are the most fish-conserving options without adequate consideration of the economic and social effects as required by National Standard 8 and without due regard for the need to achieve optimum yield as mandated by National Standard 1. For example, in calculating fishing limits in the Amendment 16 process, multiple buffers for “uncertainty,” always in favor of conservation, were applied, resulting in fishing limits much lower than that required by the SFA. Some fishing limits were set at as much 93% lower than what the Act allows. The annual allowable catch is set at 51% of the overfishing limit which resulted in an estimated loss of $220 million in revenue based on 2010 average groundfish prices. Actual catch of the multi-species complex in 2010 only realized 37% of the overfishing limit . Unnecessarily, fishing communities are thwarted from creating jobs and realizing economic prosperity.
The problems with the catch share program are rooted in the blatant and persistent abuses in the rule making process. The top down approach in the development of management frameworks and lack of collaboration has resulted in a failure of fisheries management and a complete lack of trust in the system and the federal regulatory regime by industry. This perception of industry is reinforced in the April 2011, Preston Pate and SRA-Touchstone Consulting Group Report, A Review of the New England Fishery Management Process, commissioned by NOAA/NEFMC in September 2010. This report highlights a number of serious rulemaking concerns that call for further review and corrective action. One of the report’s overall findings is that NFMS has abandoned as a mission “development of the commercial fishing industry” (Pate at 4, 13) and that the Northeast Regional Office (NERO) needs to “increase industry participation” (Pate at 18). This report also finds that the agency’s science was not adequate for the demands of the new management systems (i.e.; catch share and sector based quota systems) imposed upon the fishery.
A clear example of abuse in the rule making process surfaced during the implementation of the Amendment 16 process. The New England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC) used, and NOAA approved, a scheme that gave preferential treatment to special interests already in a sector. These same groups also receive substantial funding from Environmental Non-governmental Organizations (ENGOs) and served as the ENGO’s and NOAA’s demonstration projects for catch share systems. The basis for and fairness of allocation schemes are critical to the proper design of any fishery management system.
Another major flaw with the rulemaking process is the erroneous view of internal guidelines as law which creates needless bureaucratic rigidity and prevents the use of the best available science. NMFS Scientific and Statistical committees have been limiting themselves to NOAA/NMFS guidelines that provide NMFS interpretation of the National Standards in the SFA, claiming that these guidelines are the “law.” These guidelines are extremely restrictive and specify that scientists must use certain identified formulas, factors, assumptions, calculations and variables. As a result, they prevent scientists from using the best available science for each situation as the science and data develops. By way of example on November 5, 2010 Governor Deval Patrick submitted a report to Secretary Gary Locke providing the scientific statistical data requisite to increasing fishing allocations, information requested by the Secretary as a means for the US Department of Commerce to enact emergency powers that would allow for such increases. This report, prepared by the Division of Marine Fisheries and the University of Dartmouth, indicates that an additional 14,500 metric tons of ground fish (such as flounder and cod) could have been safely brought to market without having a negative impact on conservation measures. The request was denied over 60 days later due to the Secretary claiming that no new scientific data had been analyzed in order to support the report’s conclusion. The Secretary’s position was a classic bureaucratic catch-22 in that only NOAA produced data is considered when allocations are determined. For this very reason the report was based on a scientifically appropriate recalculation using NOAA’s fishery data. The Secretary’s request for additional information was disingenuous to say the least. NOAA is acting as if they are dealing with proofing reading mathematical equations rather than a human crisis unfolding in real time as a result of its own narrow and unlawful regulations.
Economic and public resource implications must be the cornerstone of any management system. The impacts on industry and fishing communities (i.e.; households, employment, schools and drop-out rates, etc.) merit important consideration and must be equally weighed by the US Department of Commerce, NOAA, and the NEFMC. The commercial fishing industry will suffer irreversible economic damage without significant changes to the way NOAA does business. It is time to get fishery management back on track. NOAA must allow the fishing industry and scientists from outside NOAA to help build an appropriate fisheries management system and to renew industry trust in the process. There is a need to develop an institutional mechanism to address systematic management shortfalls and reorganize how the fishery is managed institutionally with a structural/agency/program level system of checks and balances that demands accountability of the regulating authorities. Complete reform of NOAA’s management system which provides for transparency and public accountability must become a priority for Congress. Thank you for your consideration.